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A b stract. Activation Codes are used in many different digital services 
and known by many different names including voucher, e-coupon and 
discount code. In  this paper we focus on a specific class of ACs that are 
short, human-readable, fixed-length and represent value. Even though 
this class of codes is extensively used there are no general guidelines for 
the design of Activation Code schemes. We discuss different methods 
that are used in practice and propose BEPA C , a new Activation Code 
scheme that provides both authenticity and confidentiality. The small 
message space of activation codes introduces some problems that are il­
lustrated by an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack (CPA-2) on a general 
3-round Feistel network of size 22n. This attack recovers the complete 
permutation from at most 2n+2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs. For this rea­
son, BEPA C  is designed in such a way that authenticity and confiden­
tiality are independent of each other, i.e. loss of confidentiality does not 
imply loss of authenticity.
Keyw ords: activation code, e-coupon, voucher, Feistel network, small 
domain encryption, financial cryptography.
1 Introduction
This paper introduces Activation Codes (A C s) as a generic term  for codes that 
are used in many different d igital services. They are known by many different 
names including voucher, e-coupon and discount code. The common properties 
of these codes are that they need to be short, human-readable, have a fixed 
length and can be traded for economic benefit. There are schemes [4,5,8] that 
include all kinds of property inform ation in the code itself or include digital 
signatures [14,12]. This makes the codes unsuitable for manual entry and thus 
for printing on products, labels or receipts. The focus of this paper is on ACs 
that can be printed and m anually entered such as the A C  that is printed on a
* The work described in this paper has been supported in part by the European Com­
mission through the IC T  programme under contract ICT-2007-216676 E C R Y P T  II.
receipt in Figure 1. In  this case the customer can enter the A C  ‘TY5FJAHB’ later 
on on a website to receive some product. W e propose a scheme called B E P A C  
to generate and verify this class of ACs. B E P A C  is an acronym for Best Effort 
and Practice Activation Codes. Here ‘best practice’ covers the use of a keyed 
hash function to satisfy authenticity and ‘best effort’ covers the use of a Feistel 
network to satisfy confidentiality.
Security plays an im portant in the design 
of an A C  system because of the economic 
value it represents. A  system breach could re­
sult in big financial losses. Nevertheless, to the 
best of our knowledge, there are no guidelines 
on the design of secure A C  systems that con­
sider the previously mentioned properties. De­
spite the lack of general guidelines for good 
practice, ACs are extensively used. This un­
derlines the need for a proper A C  scheme 
that relies on elementary, well-studied, cryp­
tographic prim itives and a scheme that provides authenticity and confidentiality. 
F irst, we discuss some examples that illustrate the need for a scheme that pro­
vides both confidentiality and authenticity. Then, we give a general definition of 
an A C  scheme and use it as a reference throughout this paper.
Our C on trib u tion  This paper addresses some known methods that are used 
to generate ACs and proposes B E P A C , an A C  scheme that combines best effort 
w ith best practice, which is based on well-studied cryptographic prim itives. Be­
cause of these prim itives we can guarantee unique authentic codes that provide 
a satisfactory level of confidentiality. Confidentiality is obtained by a Feistel con­
struction. The Feistel construction has weak theoretical bounds when used on a 
small domain, therefore we do not rely on it for authenticity. W e use the work of 
Black  and Rogaway [3] on small domain encryption and make some small changes 
to achieve confidentiality. A  practical attack on a general 3-round Feistel network 
is presented to demonstrate the weak bounds of the Feistel construction. For au­
thenticity, we solely rely on a keyed-hash message authentication code (H M A C ) 
of the serial number, where the size of this H M A C  is dependent on P . This 
separated design allows a separate analysis of both confidentiality and authen­
ticity. An advantage of this approach is that authenticity is not autom atically 
compromised when confidentiality is broken. Fina lly, a B E P A C  solution fits on 
a sm artcard and therefore allows A C  generation and clearance to be performed 
in a controlled environment.
R ela ted  W ork Black and Rogaway [3] propose the Generalized Feistel Cipher 
(G F C ) as a solution to small domain encryption. This elegant solution can be 
used to construct a perm utation on any finite domain. In  the B E P A C  scheme we 
use their method in a slightly adapted way and solely to provide confidentiality. 
This also means that we have to make some decisions on the Feistel network 
parameters. Black  and Rogaway provide an adapted proof of Luby [15] to prove
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secrecy of a 3-round Feistel network. However, in their example configuration, 
the single D ES  round function does not give the 3 x 56-bit security since single 
D E S  can be broken by exhaustive key search [26] . Moreover, this can be done 
round by round. As a result, we have actually 58-bit security. In  [2] 128-bit A E S  
was proposed as a pseudo-random function which drastically increases the effort 
needed to break one round of the Feistel network by brute-force. However, the 
adaptive chosen-plaintext attack (CPA-2) on a 3-round Feistel network presented 
in this paper shows that the keylength of the pseudo-random function used in 
each round does not have any influence on the attack complexity. Research on 
Feistel networks [23,21,19,15,13,22] has resulted in theoretical security bounds. 
Feistel constructions of six or more rounds are secure against adaptive chosen 
plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks (C PC A-2) when the number of queries 
m ^  2n, see [23,13] .
There is more related literature on the design of ACs, but to the best of 
our knowledge there are no proposals for the class of A C  schemes that we dis­
cuss in this paper. In  [4,5,8] Blundo et al. introduce an e-coupon which is 420 
bytes in size. This scheme uses a message authentication code (M A C ) over some 
characterizing data like the identity of the manufacturer, name of the promoted 
product, expiry date etc. The resulting e-coupons contain valuable inform ation 
but are too large to be entered m anually by a user. In  the work of Kum ar et 
al. [14] and Jakobssen et al. [12] a coupon is basically a d igital signature which 
also means that they describe re latively large e-coupons. Chang et al. [6] rec­
ognize the problem of efficiency and describe a scheme that is more suitable 
for mobile phones that have less processing power. On the one hand, they cir­
cumvent the use of public key cryptography which reduces the com putational 
complexity, but on the other hand, their scheme produces re latively long codes. 
None of the schemes described previously satisfy the requirement of short codes 
that can be entered manually.
M atsuyam a and Fujim ura [17] describe a d igital ticket management scheme 
for a system where tickets can be traded between users. The authors discuss 
an account-based and an smartcard-based approach and conclude that both ap­
proaches have drawbacks in terms of maintenance costs and trust. S im ilarly to 
Blundo et al., M atsuyam a and Fujim ura try  to treat m any different types of tick­
ets that are only circulated electronically. This in contrast w ith B E P A C  which 
focuses on codes that can easily be printed on product wrappings and later be 
m anually entered by a user. Our intention is not to define a trading system where 
ACs can be fa irly transfered from one person to another. Such contextual re­
quirements are defined in R F C  3506 as Voucher Trading Systems (V T S ). Terada 
et al. [29] come w ith a copy protection mechanism for a V T S  and use public key 
cryptography. This makes the vouchers only suitable for electronic circulation 
and it is for example not practical to print them on products. Furtherm ore, R F C  
3506 and [17] do not discuss methods on how to generate these vouchers securely 
W e propose the B E P A C  scheme in order to fill this gap.
2 AC Schem e Selection
This section first discusses some examples of A C  systems. Then, two different 
approaches to set up an A C  scheme are discussed and their main drawbacks 
are visited. A fter this, the Generalized Feistel Cipher of [3] is introduced in 
Section 2.1 which has some useful concepts that we use in our scheme. The 
focus of an A C  scheme design lays on scalability, cost-efficiency and off-line use. 
Finally, forgery of ACs should be hard, an adversary is only able to forge ACs 
w ith a very small predefined probability.
E xam p les o f  A ctiv a tio n  C od es First, we discuss some examples of A C  in 
real life. A  good first example is the scratch prepaid card that is used in the 
telecommunication industry. To use a prepaid card, the customer typ ica lly needs 
to remove some foil and reveals a code. This hidden code represents money and is 
in its turn used to obtain mobile phone credits. Then we have the e-coupon which 
is a w idely used replacement for the conventional paper coupon. Like the prepaid 
card of our previous example, the e-coupon represents money. It  is m ostly used to 
give financial discount or rebate at the checkout of a webshop. Our last example is 
the one-time password that gives access to on-line content. This content should 
only be accessible to authenticated people who possess this unique password; 
think of sneak previews of new m aterial or software distribution.
A ll the aforementioned examples use unique codes that should be easy to 
handle, that is, people should be able to m anually copy ACs w ithout much 
effort. A t the same time, it should be impossible for an adversary to use an 
AC  more than once or autonomously generate a new valid AC . Altogether, ACs 
are unique codes that have to guarantee authenticity. An A C  system provides 
authenticity when an adversary is not able to forge ACs. It  is a misconception 
that authenticity only is enough for an A C  scheme. In  the end, ACs are used in 
a com petitive environment most of the time. W hen vendor A  starts a campaign 
where ACs are used to promote a product and provide it for free to customers, 
then it is not desirable that vendor B  finds out details about this campaign 
like the number of released ACs. Other details might be the value that different 
ACs represent or the expiry date of ACs. It  is for this reason that we need 
confidentiality, which means that an adversary is not able to recognize patterns 
or extract any inform ation from a released AC.
M any systems use codes that need to provide the properties discussed above. 
In  this paper we refer to all these codes as ACs. B y  an A C  scheme S  we indicate 
a tuple (A , N , P , A) where A  is the size of the used alphabet, N  is the number 
of desired ACs, P  determines the probability P  = -p of an adversary guessing 
an A C  and A is the length of the ACs.
D a ta b a se  A pproach  The database approach is very straightforward and con­
sists of a database that contains all the released ACs and their current status. 
The generation of new A C  entries is done by a pseudo-random function. W hen 
a customer redeems an AC , its status is set to ‘used’. An advantage of the
database approach is that the randomness of the ACs is d irectly related to the 
randomness of the pseudo-random generator. So, it is im portant to select a good 
pseudo-random generator, e.g. a F IP S  certified one. On the other hand, the 
protection of this valuable data is still a problem. For instance, if  an attacker 
manages to add entries to the database or is able to change the record status 
to ‘unused’, it w ill be hard to detect this fraud in time. Also, it is necessary to 
check any new A C  against all existing entries since there might be a collision. 
As a consequence, access to the complete set of ACs is needed on generation of 
new ACs.
B lock  C ipher A pproach  Another approach is to use a block cipher that gives 
a random perm utation F  : {0 ,1 }n ^  {0 ,1 }n from serial numbers to ACs. The 
provider m aintains a counter i to keep track of the number of generated ACs. 
This way the authenticity of a serial number can be checked since only ACs 
that decrypt to a serial < i are valid. A  disadvantage of this method is the size 
of the resulting A C  which is 128-bits for A E S  and 64-bits for 3D ES. For A E S , 
this results in a string of about 21 characters when we use numbers, upper- 
and lowercase characters in our alphabet. For 3D ES, this is about 11 characters. 
Sm aller block ciphers do exist, like K a ta n  [10] which is 32-bits, but are not 
very well-studied. Furtherm ore, block ciphers force ACs to have a length that 
is a m ultiple of the block size b. An alternative could be the concept of elastic 
block ciphers [9] which is an extended scheme where variable message sizes are 
allowed as input. Moreover, this scheme uses well-studied block ciphers. Still, 
the m inim al size of a plaintext message is the block size b of the incorporated 
block cipher. So, this does not give any advantage and is still too large for our 
target, which is roughly 20 to 50-bit codes.
2.1 Sm all D om ain  C iphers
Black and Rogaway introduce the Generalized Feistel Cipher (G F C ) in [3] . The 
G FC  is designed to allow the construction of arb itrary domain ciphers. Here, 
arb itrary domain means a domain space that is not necessarily {0 ,1 }n . For ACs 
we want to use a sm all domain cipher where the domain size can be customized 
to a certain extent, therefore we look into the proposed method in [3]. Before 
we describe the Generalized Feistel Cipher, we briefly visit the basic Feistel 
construction.
F eiste l N etw o rk  A  Feistel network [16] is a perm utation that 
takes an input x of size 2n, then performs a number of rounds r 
w ith round functions f 1, ..., f r , and finally delivers an output y of 
size 2n. The input is split into two blocks (L , R )  € {0 ,1 }2xn. As 
shown in Figure 2, every right block is input to a round function 
fj. The output of this function is combined w ith the left block 
and becomes the new right block, e.g. L '  = f i ( R )  + L  for G FC .
The original right block becomes the new left block. For the ease
Fig. 2: Feistel
of decryption the last output blocks are swapped in case of an 
odd number of rounds (which is the case in Fig . 2) .
G en era lized  F e iste l C ipher The G FC  of B lack  and Rogaway [3] was intro­
duced to handle flexible domain sizes. Take for example an encryption E  : 514 ^  
514 which is not a domain that is captured by standard block cipher algorithms. 
Such arb itrary finite domains might be useful in situations where data needs 
to be encrypted and stored in a certain format. Think for example of particular 
database fields that need to be encrypted opposed to fields that stay unencrypted 
while residing in the same database table. The B E P A C  scheme borrows some of 
the ideas of G FC  to be able to construct arb itrarily  sized A C  configurations.
In  G FC  the left and right block of the Feistel network are “sim ilarly sized” 
which means that their domain size may deviate a little . For the particular 
case of ACs we have looser restrictions on the arbitrariness of our domain and 
we can increase the guessing probability P  to influence the domain size. As a 
consequence, the system parameters of B E P A C  can be chosen such that the left 
and right block are equally sized.
An obvious way to use the Feistel network is to create a pseudorandom 
perm utation F  : K x M ^ M  where K  and M  are the keyspace and message 
space respectively. To generate ACs, we take as plaintext an index i and use the 
resulting ciphertext as A C  a. In  order to check a  the provider keeps track of the 
last index i and considers a given a  valid when F - 1(a ) < i. This construction 
guarantees:
1. Collision-freeness, since F  is a perm utation.
2. Valid serial numbers, they cannot be predicted since F  is a pseudorandom
perm utation.
As B lack  and Rogaway already conclude in [3] the Generalized Feistel Cipher 
has weak security bounds when used in applications where the message space is 
roughly from k = 230 up to k = 260. This suggests that our second argument 
might not be that strong.
Also, there lies a problem in the way i is embedded. The serial i is kept secret 
and one might argue that this presumes unforgeability since the adversary does 
not have access to the plaintext. However, an adversary can still make useful 
assumptions about the plaintext since the ACs are generated from consecutive 
serial numbers. In  the G FC , the left block L  and right block R  are in itiated as 
follows:
L  = i mod 2n, R  = |_i/2nJ
Here, L  represents the least significant bits of i, and the successor of every i 
always causes a change in L . On the contrary, when i is sequentially incremented, 
the value of R  changes only once every 2n times. This way, the first 2n ACs are 
generated w ith R  = 0, the second 2n ACs w ith R  = 1 , etc. The problems that 
this little  example already points out are further explained in Appendix A . Here 
we present a practical attack on a three-round Feistel construction in order to 
illustrate the problem that occurs when a sm all number of rounds is chosen, and 
an embedding of serials is used as suggested in [3].
3 B EPA C  Schem e
In  this section we propose our Activation Code Scheme called B E P A C . Its  pri­
m ary objective is to ensure authenticity and its secondary objective is to provide 
confidentiality. Confidentiality is satisfied up to the security bounds given by 
B lack  and Rogaway in [3] . In  the B E P A C  scheme, loss of confidentiality does 
not affect the authenticity property.
The authenticity is achieved in an obvious way by the use of an H M A C  which 
is a keyed hash function. W e take the truncated H M A C  h of a sequence number 
i and concatenate it to i itself. For this concatenation we use an embedding m 
like the one used by B lack  and Rogaway in [3] and Spies in [28,2]. W e re ly on 
the strength of the underlying hash function which covers the best practice part 
of our solution: ACs are not forgeable. The length of an H M A C  is usually too 
long for the ease of use that is demanded for ACs. Therefore we introduce the 
probability P  = -p that puts a lower bound on the success rate of guessing correct 
ACs. W e use this parameter to lim it the length of the codes, i.e. P  determines 
the size of the H M A C . A  lower success probability for an adversary is achieved 
by concatenating a bigger part of the H M A C  and thus in a longer AC.
Our solution differs from encryption schemes for small domains [3,18] in the 
sense that we make a clear separation between the part that provides authen­
tic ity  and the part that provides confidentiality. The latter is added as an ad­
d itional operation on the embedding m. W e use a balanced Feistel construction 
as proposed in [3] to create the necessary confusion and diffusion. This separa­
tion between authenticity and confidentiality is really different from an approach 
where the sequence number i is d irectly fed into to a Feistel construction and 
when it solely depends on this construction for its authenticity. The attack in 
Appendix A  demonstrates that for authenticity we cannot rely on a Feistel con­
struction when it is used on a small domain. These results form the basis of our 
design decision.
3.1 AC S chem e S etu p
The B E P A C  scheme setup is a simple con­
struction (see Fig . 3) where an embedding m 
of an index i and a part of H M A C (i) are fed 
into a Feistel network. Since this is a balanced 
Feistel network, m needs to be divided into 
two equally sized blocks. W hen this is not 
possible a small part h' of H M A C (i) bypasses 
the Feistel network and is embedded together 
w ith the cryptogram  c from the Feistel net­
work to form A C  a.
The B E P A C  A C  scheme S  is a tuple 
(A , N , P , A, w) where A  is the size of the al­
phabet, A + w is the length of the ACs where 
A is always even and w is either 0 or 1. Then,
Fig. 3: BEPA C  Scheme
Serial i 
1JS  = HMAC(i) mod
w hen len g th  is  even: h  = S 
w hen len g th  is  odd: h = |_S / A
h ' = s mod A
Feistel Network
G
Activation Code a
I  & I i J
c
J\f is the number of ACs and V  determines the probability P  = p  of obtaining 
a valid A C  by a random guess, e.g. V  = 10.000. W e assume A  < V .
D e fin itio n  1 (V a lid  A C  Sch em e). An A C  scheme S  = (A ,A f,V ,X ,co ) is 
valid when .A* Js A f  x V  x A ~ u holds and A is even.
A  valid A C  scheme S  can be obtained as follows:
(a) The user chooses the alphabet size A, desired number of ACs A f  and some 
m inim al guess probability -p.
(b ) Now the m inim al length A is calculated such that *4A >= Af x V  by taking 
A = [•^og(A/’ x V )]
(c) |*4A — J\f x V\ is minimized by taking V  = \_AX/N\
(d ) The length A can be either odd or even:
— W hen A = 2k + 1 and A  < V  then we adjust V  such that A  is a divisor 
of P . As a consequence, we might have a larger number of ACs A f.
P  = ? - ( P m o d i ) ,  A f = [ A x/V\
After these operations we obtain the system S  = (A ,A f, V , A — 1,1).
— W hen A = 2k we obtain the system S  = (A ,JV , V , A, 0).
(e) The process is repeated from step (a) when no valid system S  is found.
3.2 G e n e ra tio n
This section describes the generation of new ACs once a valid A C  scheme is con­
figured. Algorithm  1 contains the pseudocode for A C  generation. The plaintext 
is an embedding in of a part of H M A C (j) and i itself. In  case of an odd AC  
length (u> = 1) a small part h' of H M A C (i) is excluded from this embedding. 
The part of H M A C (i) that is used in m is determined by V .
s = H M A C (i) mod V , h = |_s x ^ ^ ’J, h' = s mod A, in = h x A f+ i
The balanced Feistel construction is defined as in Section 2.1 with:
k = *4<-a/2\  L  = in mod k, R  = [in  / k\
L  and R  are the input blocks of the balanced Feistel network. W e denote the 
output blocks after r  rounds by L * and R * . W hen the number of rounds r  is 
even the cryptogram  c is given by:
c = R *  x k + L*
W hen r  is odd, the left and right block are swapped and the cryptogram  c is 
given by:
c = L*  x k + R*
This difference between odd and even is necessary to allow the same construction 
for encoding and decoding. Finally, the activation code a  is given by:
a  = c x A u + coh'
3.3  V erification
This section describes the verification of previously generated ACs for a valid 
AC  scheme. Algorithm  2 contains the pseudocode for A C  verification. G iven an 
AC  a  and an A C  scheme S  the valid ity can be checked as follows. F irst compute 
c and h' from a:
c = |_a/Aw J , h' = a  mod A w
Then, use a balanced Feistel construction from Section 2.1 w ith k = A (a/2) and 
compute L  and R  from c as follows:
L  = c mod k, R  = |_c/kJ 
L  and R  are the input blocks of the balanced Feistel network. W e denote the 
output blocks after r  rounds by L *  and R *. In  this case we want to decrypt and 
therefore use the round keys in reverse order. W hen the number of rounds r  is 
even the plaintext m is given by:
m = R * x k + L*
W hen r  is odd, the left and right block are swapped and the plaintext m is given 
by:
m = L *  x k + R *
Now, we are able to obtain the partial H M A C  h and index i from m by: 
h = |_m/NJ , i = m mod N
W e calculate the partial H M A C  ht and hi like in the encoding, but now we 
use the recovered index i. Finally, we say that a  is a valid A C  iff ht = h and 
wht = wh'.
A lgo r ith m  1 G EN ERA TE(i) A lgo r ith m  2 V E R lF Y (a )
k — a (a/2> k — A (a/2)
s — HMAC(i) mod P c — La/Aw J ; h' — a mod A^
h — Ls x A - J^ L — c mod k; R = Lc/kJ
h' — s mod A f o r  j  — r t o  1 d o
m — h x N  + i imp — (L + fj(R )) mod k
L — m mod k; R — Lm/kJ L — R; R — imp
f o r  j  — 1 t o  r d o e n d  fo r
imp — (L + fj(R )) mod k i f  r is odd t h e n
L — R; R — imp m — L x k + R
e n d  fo r e l s e
i f  r is odd t h e n m — R x k + L
c — L x k + R e n d  i f
e l s e h — Lm/NJ; i — m mod N
c — R x k + L s — HMAC(i) mod P
e n d  i f ht — Ls x A w J
a — c x Aw + wh h't — s mod A
i f  ht = h a n d  wht = wh' t h e n  
V a l id  
e l s e
I n v a l id  
e n d  i f
4 E xam ple A pplication: Sm artcard
In  this section we want to give an example of an activation code system (A C S). 
In  an A C S there are a few things that need to be managed. The index i of
the latest generated A C  and the ACs that have been used so far. Since this 
inform ation is highly valuable and represents financial value it must be well 
protected. Think of an application where the ACs are printed on prepaid cards 
covered by some scratch-off m aterial. The production of these cards is a very 
secured and well-defined process to ensure that activation codes are kept secret 
during manufacturing. These cards need to have all kinds of physical properties, 
e.g. the A C  should not be readable when the card is partly peeled off from the 
back. This can be achieved by printing a random pattern on top of the scratch-off 
foil.
A t some point there is a very critica l task to be executed when the ACs need 
to be delivered to the manufacturer. An obvious method is to encrypt the list of 
ACs w ith a secret key. Later on in the process, this list of random ly generated 
codes needs to be maintained by the vendor who sells these scratchcards. This 
induces a big security threat since leakage of this list or unauthorized modifi­
cation results in financial loss. Especia lly when it d irectly relates to the core 
business like in the telecommunications industry.
The use of a secure application module (SA M ) significantly reduces this risk. 
A  SA M  is typ ica lly a tamper-resistant device, often a sm artcard, which is in 
most cases extensively tested and certified in accordance to a standard, e.g. 
the Common C riteria3. The elegance of the solution presented in this paper 
is that it can be implemented using smartcards. The supplier determines the 
probability P , number of codes N , size of character set A  and the key K  to 
be used. An obvious approach is to use two smartcards since the production 
and clearance of activation codes are very likely to happen at two different 
locations. Both  smartcards are initialized using the same A C  scheme S  and the 
same key K . From  that moment on the first one only gives out up to N  new 
activation codes. The second one is used at the clearance house to verify and 
keep track of traded activation codes. This can be done by a sequence of bits 
where the i-th bit determines whether the i-th activation code has been cleared. 
For 400.000 activation codes approxim ately 48 k B  of storage is needed. This fits 
on a P5CT072 Sm artM X  sm artcard [20] which has 72 kB  of E E P R O M  available. 
O f course, m ultiple cards can be used if more ACs are needed.
5 A nalysis
In  this section we discuss the system parameters of B E P A C  and decide on some 
m inim al bounds and algorithms. W e tested a 6-round B E P A C  scheme for obvious 
flaws using the N IS T  random number test [27] . This test im plementation also 
delivered the numbers in Table 1 which give a good indication of the length l of 
the codes compared to different A C  scheme configurations. In  the left column the 
desired values are given for the number of codes N  and the guessing probability 
P . W e tested these different numbers for three different number of symbols A .
3 http ://www.com m oncriteriaportal.org/
D esired 00 A  = 20 A  = 31
A/' V u T^xlO ^) I B its a r T^xlO ^) I B its u T^xlO ^) I B its
in1 10J 101 26,214 6 18 101 16 4 18 101 92,352 4 20
in2 10J 102 20,968 7 21 102 32 5 22 102 286,285 5 25
10J 10J 10d 16,777 8 24 10J 64 6 26 10d 28,613 5 25
in4 10J 10.004 13,416 9 27 104 128 7 31 104 88,75 6 30
10b 10J 100.003 10,737 10 30 10b 12,8 7 31 105 275,125 7 35
10° 10J 1.000.006 68,719 12 36 10b 25,6 8 35 1.000.567 27,497 7 35
10' 10J 10.001.379 54,968 13 39 10' 51,2 9 39 10.000.012 85,289 8 40
in 8 10J 100.001.057 43,98 14 42 10H 102,4 10 44 100.010.675 264,368 9 45
10“10d 1.000.010.575 35,184 15 45 10y 10,24 10 44 1.001.045.818 26,412 9 45
Table 1: BEPA C  Configurations
5.1 S y stem  P aram eter S election
N u m b er o f  R ou nd s W e found good arguments to set the minimum number 
of rounds to six for the B E P A C  scheme. The literature shows that Feistel con­
structions of six or more rounds are secure against adaptive chosen plaintext 
and chosen ciphertext attacks (C PC A-2) when the number of queries m ^  2n, 
see [23,13]. Pa tarin  [22] shows that an adversary needs at least 23n/4 encryptions 
to distinguish a six-round Feistel construction from a random perm utation. A  
six round Feistel network sufficiently covers the risk of leaking serial number 
inform ation, but this is of course a minimum.
K ey  D er iva tion  In  the B E P A C  scheme we need different round keys for every 
Feistel round and another different key for the calculation of the H M A C  on the 
serial. W e propose to derive these keys from an in itia l random ly chosen key [1] 
by a key derivation function (K D F ). There are several definitions available for 
K D Fs  and we propose to use K D F1  which is defined in ISO  18033-2:2006 [11] . 
Recommendations for K D Fs  and their construction can also be found in [7] . The 
first key that is derived is used as the key in the H M A C  calculation of h and h' 
(Section 3) . A fter this the round keys for the Feistel construction are successively 
derived.
P seu d oran d om  F unctions Furtherm ore, we need to decide on the pseudoran­
dom functions (P R F s ) that are used as round functions of the Feistel network. 
The pseudorandomness of the perm utation defined by a Feistel network depends 
on the chosen P R F  in each round [15] . It  is straightforward to use a crypto­
graphic hash function since we already need a hash function for the H M A C  [25] 
calculation and it keeps our A C  scheme simple.
H ash  F u nction  In  the end, the B E P A C  scheme is solely based on a single 
cryptographic hash function. W e follow the secure hash standard F IP S  180-3 [24] 
and propose to use an approved hash function like SHA-256.
6 C onclusions
In  this paper we have introduced activation codes (A C s), short codes of fixed 
length, that represent value. These ACs should be scalable, cost efficient and 
forgery resistant. In  the literature, several solutions [4,5,8,14,12,6,17,29,17] han­
dle dig ital coupons or tickets that are somehow reminiscent to our notion of 
ACs. The difference is that most solutions use public key cryptography or other 
means that result in lengthy codes. In  fact, these solutions come closer to some 
extended notion of d igital cash and are not meant to give a solution on the gen­
eration of ACs. To the best of our knowledge there is no scheme that focuses 
on the class of ACs that are described in this paper (roughly think of 20 to 
50-bit codes). Our proposed A C  scheme for this class satisfies authenticity and 
confidentiality in  a way that when confidentiality is compromised it does not 
autom atically break authenticity and vice versa.
In  order to allow a re latively small and arb itrary message space for our AC  
scheme we use some of the ideas of B lack  and Rogaway [3] in their General­
ized Feistel Cipher to satisfy the confidentiality in our scheme. Several stud­
ies [23,21,19,15,13,22] show that the security bounds of Feistel constructions are 
not strong enough and thus make the use of Feistel constructions in small do­
mains questionable. To illustrate this, we have demonstrated that CPA-2 allows 
an adversary to recover the complete perm utation from only 2n+ 2 plaintext- 
ciphertext pairs. S till, the Feistel construction is suitable for the purpose of 
confidentiality in  our A C  scheme. Since confidentiality is a secondary goal, it 
relaxes the demands on the security bounds. Furtherm ore, in B E P A C  the plain­
text cannot be predicted which counters m any attacks from the literature. And 
most im portant of all, a Feistel construction defines a perm utation on the AC 
domain, which means in  practice that we do not have to store any additional 
data in order to remember which ACs are already published and which are not.
To conclude, we found satisfactory system parameters for the minimum num­
ber of Feistel rounds and we defined a method to do the key derivation for the 
round keys. Furtherm ore, we suggested a specific pseudorandom function (P R F ) 
and hash function for concrete implementations. Finally, we have implemented 
the B E P A C  scheme4 and performed some statistical tests using the N IS T  Ran­
dom Number Test [27] . This test did not reveal any obvious flaws.
It  might be interesting for future work to create a sm artcard im plementation 
of B E P A C  as suggested in Section 4.
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A Feistel Perm utation  R ecovery using CPA-2
T h eorem  1. Consider a three-round 2n-bit Feistel construction. Then there ex­
ists an algorithm that needs at most 2n+2 adaptive chosen plain-/ciphertext pairs 
to compute any ciphertext from any plaintext and vice versa without knowledge 
of the secret round keys and regardless the used keylength.
Proof. The two ciphertext blocks are defined in terms of the plaintext blocks as 
follows:
R ' = f 2( f i ( R )  + L ) + R
L '' = fs (/ 2(/ i(R ) + L ) + R ) + f i ( R )  + L  ( 1)
= fs (R ')  + f i ( R )  + L
Note that L '' uses R ' as input to /s(-). W ith  L j we denote L  = i and sim ilarly 
R j  denotes R  = j .  The notation R (j j) means the value of R ' when L j and 
R j  are used as input blocks. W e first observe that several triples (f i_ ,f2, f 3) 
lead to the same perm utation and show that it is always possible to find the 
triple w ith f 1(0) = 0. To this end, if we replace the triple ( ƒ  1, ƒ 2, f 3) w ith the 
triple ( ƒ  1, ƒ2, f3 ) defined by Equation (2) , this leads to the same perm utation 
(Equation ( 1) ) w ith the desired property that f1 (0) = 0.
f 1(x ) = A (x ) -  f 1(0 ), f 2(x ) = f 2(x + f ( 0 )), f 3(x ) = f3 (x ) + ƒ  (0 ) (2) 
So, w ithout loss of generality we may assume that ƒ  (0) = 0.
Next, we describe a method to find a triple ( ƒ ,  f 2, f 3) w ith f 1(0) = 0. F irst, 
we determine f 2, then f 1 and finally f 3.
B y  Equation (1) we get f 2:
f 2( f 1(R 0) + L i ) = R (j,0) -  R 0 = R (j,0) ^  f 2(L i ) = R (j,0) (3) 
Now, to find f 1 observe that f 1( j )  is a solution for x in the equation f 2(x ) = 
R (0 j) — R j . However, this equation does not always have one unique solution 
since f 2 is a pseudo-random function. In  case of m ultiple solutions we compare 
the output of successive (w rt. x) function inputs w ith the values for f 2(x + i)
that were found using Equation (3). Then, the correct x is the unique solution 
to:
f 2 (x + i ) = R[ij) ~  Rj  for i = 0 , . . . ,  m (4)
Sometimes m = 0 already gives a unique solution. A t the end of this section we 
show that w ith very high probability m = 1 defines a unique solution. W e find:
f i U ) = x (5)
W hen f i  and fo are both determined, L  and R  can be chosen such that every 
value for R ' G {0 , . . . ,  2n — 1} is visited. Since R ' functions as direct input to / 3 
it is possible to find all input-output pairs for /3. To visit every possible input 
value z = 0 , .. . ,  2n — 1 find a pair L*, R j  such that i? |; ^  = z. F irst, find an 
index x such that f 2 (x) = z — R j.  If  such an x does not exist choose a different 
value for R j . There is always a solution for x since R j  covers the whole domain 
of f 2 - Second, derive L
f 2 { f i { R j ) + U ) = ƒ 2 (x ) =>■ Li = X -  f i  ( R j ) (6 )
Note that the determ ination of L.,, and R j  does not need any interm ediate queries 
since it is com pletely determined by f i  and f 2 - Next, we query the system w ith 
L i  and R j  and use Equation (3) and (5) to compute / 3 as follows:
M x )  = L'(itj) -  h ( R j )  -  U. (7)
This completes the solution for a triple ( f i ,  f 2 , fs ) that results in the same per­
m utation as the Feistel construction under attack.
N u m b er o f Q u eries  The determ ination of f 2 is given by Equation (1) and costs 
2n queries. The determ ination of f i  is given by Equation (4). The probability P  
that there exists an x' 7  ^x for an x chosen in advance such that
(f2(x) = f 2 (x ')) A I f \  /2(*  + i ) = / 2(* ' + i) (8)
can be split into two parts. F irst, the probability P I  that there is a collision 
fs (x ) = ƒ 2(.^ ’,) w ith x 7^  x '. Then, the probability P 2 that a preselected posi­
tion f 2 (x + i) has the same value as some other preselected position f 2 (x ' + i). 
P I  = 1 — and P 2 = -. Now, P  = P I  • P 2 m because we need tov n '  n  7
m ultip ly by P 2 for every other successive match. To conclude, the probability 
that there is an x' 7  ^ x for a Feistel construction of size 2 • n and m successive 
queries in Equation (8 ), i.e. the probability that there is no unique solution x to 
Equation (4), is the probability
P = ^ -------L . / ' H I l L ' )  ( 9 )
n m n m \  n J
So, P  < ^  and depending on the size of n, m = 1 already gives P  close to 
zero. In  practice one might sometimes need an additional query (m  = 2) or 
only one query (m  = 0), but on average m = 1. This means that the cost 
for determ ination of f i  is 2 • 2n queries on average. Then, the determ ination 
of / 3 is given by Equation (7) and costs at most 2n queries. As a result, the 
determ ination of ( ƒ  1, ƒ 2, /3) has an upper bound of 2n+2 queries.
